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I. INTRODUCTION
This comment originates from a debate that the Akron Law
Federalist Society at the University of Akron School of Law hosted.
The participants considered the legalities of U.S. policies with respect to
the detention, interrogation, and trial of detainees held in Guantanamo
Bay. This Comment analyzes some of the legal issues discussed during
that debate and also touches on recent issues related to the detention and
trials of detainees held in Guantanamo Bay.

 Kyndra Rotunda is an Associate Professor of Military and International Law at Chapman
University, Executive Director of the Military Law & Policy Institute and AMVETS Legal Clinic,
Lecturer at Berkeley Law, former Army JAG Officer (Major), former Guantanamo Bay Prosecutor,
and author of HONOR BOUND: INSIDE THE GUANTANAMO TRIALS (Carolina Academic Press 2008),
and MILITARY AND VETERANS LAW (West Publishing 2011).
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II. LAW GOVERNING MILITARY COMMISSIONS1
In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. Military, under President George
W. Bush’s Administration, began holding enemy combatants captured in
the Global War on Terror, at the U.S. Naval base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.2 On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an Executive
Order that laid the groundwork to bring some of these detainees to trial
3
before military commission. Section four of that same order instructed
the Secretary of Defense to draft rules governing Military
Commissions.4 At a minimum, the President directed full and fair trials
with a commission that decides both fact and law; allows the admission
of any evidence having probative value to a reasonable person; protects
classified information, provides for conviction and sentence by a twothirds majority; and requires review of the trial record by either the
Secretary of Defense or the President himself.5
Responding to the President, the Secretary of Defense then drafted
Military Commission Order Number One, which succinctly set forth
procedures for military commissions.6 Section five, entitled Procedures
Accorded to the Accused, guaranteed the accused several rights, which
included a copy of charges in the defendant’s language; the presumption
of innocence until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; assigned
defense counsel; provided access to information the prosecution intends
to use at trial and any evidence tending to exculpate the defendant;
guaranteed that the defendant is not required to testify against himself,
but may testify on his own behalf (the right to remain silent); guaranteed
the defendant’s right to be present except when it violates laws
governing classified information or when the defendant is disruptive;
allowed the detainee access to information used in sentencing; afforded
the right to present evidence and to make a statement at a sentencing

1. For a more detailed discussion of Military Commissions, see Kyndra Rotunda, HONOR
BOUND: INSIDE THE GUANTANAMO TRIALS 147-63 (2008).
2. For a discussion of the historical, legal underpinnings of Military Commissions dating to
the Revolutionary War, see Kyndra Rotunda, A Comparative Historical Analysis of War Time
Procedural Protections and Presidential Powers: From the Civil War to the War on Terror, 12
CHAPMAN L. REV 449 (2009).
3. President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 67, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
4. Id.
5. Detention, Treatment & Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66
FR 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
6. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMM’N ORDER NO. 1 (Aug. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2005/d20050902order.pdf.
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hearing; guaranteed open public trials; and afforded protection against
7
double jeopardy.
In the summer of 2006, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld8
invalidated military commissions on statutory grounds, holding that
President Bush must first receive specific approval from Congress
before using military tribunals to try suspected wartime criminals.9 The
Court did not determine that military commissions were
unconstitutional. Instead, the Court simply called on Congress to either
approve the rules or to codify new ones. The Court interpreted
Congress’s “Authorization for the Use of Military Force” not to allow
the President to hold Military Commissions and said that Congress must
specifically approve Military Commissions.10
The Court added,
“Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the
authority he believes necessary. . . If Congress, after due consideration,
deems it appropriate to change the controlling statutes, in conformance
with the constitution and other laws, it has the prerogative to do so.”11
Congress responded to the Supreme Court and specifically
authorized Military Commissions by adopting a set of rules, which it
codified in the Military Commissions Act of 2006.12 The rules reflected
much of what was already contained in the Military Commission Order
Number One. Generally, the rules excluded information obtained by
torture,13 guaranteed defendants the right to represent themselves,14
guaranteed that defendants cannot be excluded from their trials except
when they are disruptive and only after being warned by the judge,15 and
protected the sources and methods of classified information.16 Further,
the rules allowed defendants to appeal their convictions to the District of
Columbia Circuit Court, and, in some cases, ultimately to the United
17
States Supreme Court.

7. Id.
8. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 636-37.
11. Id.
12. Military Comm’n Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006).
13. Id. § 948r(a)(“A statement obtained by use of torture shall not be admissible in a military
commission under this chapter, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the
statement was made”).
14. Id. § 948a(b)(D).
15. Id. §§ 948a, 949d(e).
16. Id. §§ 948a, 949d(f).
17. Id. §§ 948a, 950(g).
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III. MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2009: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
On January 22, 2009, shortly after assuming office, President
Barack Obama issued an executive order closing (eventually) the United
18
States military detention facility at Guantanamo Bay.
He also
criticized the procedures governing military commission and halted
those trials that were then underway.19 The Executive Order also called
for a committee to review whether and how Guantanamo Bay detainees
should be prosecuted,20 despite the fact that Congress had already
codified the procedures in the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
A few months later, during a press conference on May 21, 2009,
President Obama surprisingly endorsed Military Commissions as a
legitimate means of trying war criminals. He commented, “Military
commissions have a history dating back to George Washington and the
Revolutionary War. They are an appropriate venue for trying detainees
for violations of the laws of war.” He stated that his changed view of
21
Military Commissions did not constitute “a reversal on my part.”
President Obama endorsed the use of Military Commissions but
also proposed several amendments to the Military Commission Act,
which he said would “bring military commissions in line with the rule of
law.”22 The proposed reforms generally included: (1) banning the use
of evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman, or degrading interrogation
methods; (2) shifting the burden to prosecutors to prove that hearsay
evidence is reliable (instead of placing the burden on opponents to prove
it is unreliable); (3) giving “greater latitude” to defendants to select their
own lawyers; and (4) generally providing “more protections” if
defendants refuse to testify. 23
A.

Use of Potentially Coerced Statements

The most substantive reform that President Obama proposed was
the ban on certain types of evidence. One significant problem with the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 is that it left open the door for
prosecutors, in some instances, to rely on statements obtained through
18. Exec. Order No. 13492, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, 74 F.R. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 4(c)(3).
21. The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by The President on National
Security (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-bythe-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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coercion.24 Specifically, the Military Commissions Act of 2006
included a provision that allowed statements, in which the degree of
coercion was disputed, to be admitted, so long as the statement was
reliable, probative, and conducive to the interest of justice.25
Under the Act, statements that the prosecutors obtained before
December 30, 2005 were treated differently than those made after that
date. The Act barred the use of any statements made after December 30,
2005 if the interrogation method used to obtain the statement would
violate the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.26 But that bar applied only to statements made after
December 30, 2005 (the date that Congress enacted the Detainee
Treatment Act.)27
The bizarre and unjust result of these two provisions is that they
would allow prosecutors to rely on coerced evidence in some instances.
The only trigger that would bar the use of such evidence was the passage
of time. Thus, detainees interrogated on December 29, 2005 could be
28
convicted based on evidence procured through coercive means.
In
contrast, the law offered greater protections to a detainee interrogated on
or after December 30, 2005.
The Obama Administration presumably realized that these
conflicting provisions were unfair and could lead to unjust convictions.
To that end, Congress amended this provision in the Military
Commissions Act of 2009, which includes a clear and simple ban on the
use of statements obtained by torture or by any means that would violate
the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.29
This prohibition mirrors U.S. law and is fairly categorized as a
substantive amendment. It is, quite clearly, a step in the right direction
and a significant improvement to the Military Commissions Act of 2006.

24. Military Comm’n Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948r (b)-(c) (2006).
25. 10 U.S.C. § 948r (c)(1)-(2) (2006).
26. Id. § 948r(d).
27. Id. § 948r(d).
28. Information that the Government obtained by coercion can be reliable. For example, in
response to coercion, the detainee might say, “I buried the weapon under the Oak tree.” The
Government could then check under the Oak tree and find the weapon. That evidence is what is
called “fruit of the poisonous tree.” That is, the evidence is the product of coercion. Yes, the
information can be reliable, but we should not admit that evidence because it is the product of
coercion, and admitting it rewards the coercion. No Article III court will admit such evidence
unless the defendant offered the testimony voluntarily after Miranda warnings.
29. Detainee Treatment Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948r(a) (2009).
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Latitude in Selecting Defense Lawyers

While the categorical ban on evidence procured through coercion
was an important and substantive amendment, other amendments that
President Obama proposed and that Congress adopted are far less
substantive. One might even think of them as window dressing.
For instance, the Obama Administration advanced amendments to
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 that would provide “greater
latitude for detainees to select their lawyers.”30 However, a careful
comparison of the 2006 and 2009 versions of the Military Commissions
Act reveals that Congress adopted no substantive change to the law with
respect to the detainees’ ability or right to select their lawyers.
Congress adopted one provision that requires the Secretary of
Defense to separately promulgate rules to evaluate the performance of
defense counsel in capital cases.31 However, JAG lawyers—like every
Military Officer—already receive periodic evaluations (Officer
Evaluation Reports) and, just like lawyers in the private sector, their
performance is constantly evaluated by higher-ranking lawyers within
the firm, or in this case, within the military. While it cannot hurt to more
carefully, and more deliberately, review the work of defense lawyers
involved in capital cases, the provision is duplicative and unlikely to
significantly impact Military Commissions. This is particularly true
because none of the cases pending before Military Commissions are
capital cases.
The amended Military Commissions Act also includes a new
provision that allows the detainee to request a particular military defense
counsel by name, who will represent the detainee so long as that named
32
defense lawyer is reasonably available. This provision will probably
benefit some detainees, who are able to select a defense lawyer they
regard as a good choice. However, there is nothing particularly
substantive about this provision either. Randomly assigning defense
counsel is a regularly accepted practice. Indeed, U.S. criminal
defendants do not have their pick of the litter. The judge simply
appoints a lawyer and, unless that lawyer has a legitimate conflict of
interest, the trial proceeds with the appointed lawyer. Hence, this new
procedure will give detainees greater rights than any criminal defendant
tried in state or federal court.

30. Remarks by the President on National Security, supra note 21.
31. Military Comm’n Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948K (4)(c)(2) (2009).
32. 10 U.S.C. § 949c(2) (2009).
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Additional 5th Amendment Protections

Both the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and of 2009 include
Fifth Amendment protections, which make clear that no defendant shall
33
be required to testify against himself or herself. The only difference is
that the language appears at a different place in the Military
Commissions Act, and the 2009 version inserts the phrase “or herself”,
presumably in an effort to clarify that the protection would apply to both
male and female defendants—something that is already plainly clear.34
The Military Commissions Act of 2009 includes additional
restrictions on using statements of the accused that were properly
obtained. These statements may be admitted as evidence if the judge
finds that the statements are reliable and probative; that they were made
incident to lawful conduct during military operations or upon capture;
and that the interest of justice is served by admitting the statements or
that the statement was voluntarily given. It specifies that whether a
statement is “voluntary” will rest on a number of factors, including the
circumstances; sophistication and education level of the individual
detainee; and the lapse in time, change of place, or change of identity in
35
the questioner.
While this provision helps to clarify the use of voluntary
statements, it is only a more detailed telling of what already was the law.
Under the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the judge already enjoyed
discretion to admit statements based on the “totality of circumstances”
that render the statement reliable,36 which would clearly encompass the
factors that are now spelled out in the 2009 version. Presumably, the
outcome would be the same under both versions of the Military
Commissions Act.

33. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 states “No person shall be required to testify
against himself at a proceeding of a military commission under this chapter.” 10 U.S.C. § 948r(a)
(2006). The Military Commissions Act of 2009 states “No person shall be required to testify
against himself or herself at a proceeding of military commission under this chapter.” 10 U.S.C. §
948r(b) (2009).
34. 10 U.S.C. § 948r(b) (2009).
35. Id. § 948r(c)-(d).
36. Id. § 948r(a)-(d).
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IV. INDEFINITE DETENTION AND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS37
The 2009 amendments to the Military Commissions Act, on the
whole, provide additional procedural protections to the defendants.
However, the problem is that these new rules are not generally
applicable. They apply only to a particular subset of detainees.
President Obama, through other measures, has recently excluded some
detainees from being eligible for trial by Military Commissions. It
seems that what he gives with one hand, he takes away with the other.
What good is a robust body of law that can be set aside when the
government thinks that it is inconvenient?
While the Obama Administration initiated reforms to the Military
Commissions Act, it simultaneously excluded some detainees from
coverage under the Act. The Obama Administration has determined that
some detainees are too dangerous to ever be released, but that
insufficient evidence exists to bring them to trial for their crimes.38
These detainees are automatically ineligible for trial by military
commission. Instead, these detainees will face indefinite detention
without a trial.
Think about this: the class of detainees who have the least
protection are those detainees who have the least amount of evidence
against them. The government announces that they are dangerous, but
the government does not have sufficient evidence to persuade a neutral
fact-finder of that belief. The detention for this class of detainees is also
indefinite. An administrative decision—not a trial—imposes indefinite
39
imprisonment.

37. For more detailed analysis of the Geneva Convention’s application to Guantanamo Bay,
see Kyndra Rotunda, Applying Geneva Convention Principles to Guantanamo Bay, 43 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1067 (2009).
38. Remarks by the President on National Security, supra note 21:
Now, finally there remains the question of detainees at Guantanamo who cannot be
prosecuted yet who pose a clear danger to the American people. And I have to be honest
here—this is the toughest single issue that we will face. We’re going to exhaust every
avenue that we have to prosecute those at Guantanamo who pose a danger to our
country. But even when this process is complete, there may be a number of people who
cannot be prosecuted for past crimes, in some cases because evidence may be tainted,
but who nonetheless pose a threat to the security of the United States. Examples of that
include people who’ve received extensive explosive training at al Qaeda training camps,
or commanded Taliban troops in battle, or expressed their allegiance to Osama bin
Laden, or otherwise made it clear that they want to kill Americans. These are people
who, in effect, remain at war with the United States. Let me repeat: I am not going to
release individuals who endanger the American people.
39. Exec. Order No. 13567, Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantánamo Bay
Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (Mar. 7, 2011), available
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This imposition of indefinite detention without trial raises serious
concerns under both International Law and U.S. Law. Let us now turn
to that issue.
Geneva Convention III, relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, requires that detainees be repatriated “without delay” at the end of
hostilities.40 The Official Commentary to that provision refers to the
repatriation provision as “one of the most important Articles in the
Convention,” observing that it is “intended to remedy very
unsatisfactory situations.”41 Thus, the plain language of the Geneva
Conventions makes clear that, at the end of active hostilities, all
detainees not pending trial must be repatriated to their home countries.
Holding detainees until the end of the war does not mean that the
U.S. government can hold them indefinitely. Neither the Geneva
conventions nor international law provides for such discretion. It means
that the Government can hold the detainees to the end of the war.
In a war like the present one, it is unclear when the war is over. We
do not expect it would end in a typical fashion. It is unlikely that there
will be a formal signing of a peace treaty with Al Qaeda.. However, the
Supreme Court has anticipated that question and had provided an
42
answer. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that the United States
can hold detainees “for the duration of the conflict in which they were
captured.” 43 Put another way, we can hold detainees until hostilities end
and the troops come home. At some point, the troops will no longer be
fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whether they return home because the
war is won or because we just decide to leave, when the troops come
back, the war ends. At that point, international law provides that we
must release the detainees.
It is doubtful that President Obama can authorize the indefinite
detention of prisoners captured during a war once the war ends. The
President appears to understand the problem. In understanding the
problem, President Obama seeks to hold individual detainees who are,
“in effect,” at war with the United States because of their individual

at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/executive-order-periodic-reviewindividuals-detained-guant-namo-bay-nava (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
40. Geneva Convention III, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 118-119.
41. Jean De Preux et al., Commentary III, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War 541 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960).
42. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
43. Id. at 518 (stating “We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited
category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured,
is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and
appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use”).
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desires “to kill Americans.”44 Neither U.S. law nor international law
recognizes that argument. When WWII ended, there may well have
been individual Germans who still had a desire “to kill Americans,” but
we would not have had the power to detain them indefinitely simply
because we determined, without trial, that they had evil in their hearts.
A.

Indefinite Detention in U.S. Prisons

President Obama has lobbied Congress for authority to move
detainees from the detention camp in Guantanamo Bay to maximum
security prisons in the United States. However, this plan has failed to
gain traction with Congress. On the contrary, Congress responded on
December 22, 2010. In responding, Congress inserted an amendment to
the National Defense Authorization Act, which bans the use of federal
funds to bring any detainee to the United States for trial or for detention.
This statute mirrors our international obligations. The Geneva
Convention III, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, also
prohibits housing detainees in U.S. maximum security prisons. Geneva
Convention III, article 22 speaks to the issue, stating that detainees
“shall not be interned in penitentiaries.” Furthermore, the Geneva
Conventions also require particular conditions of detention, including
the freedom of movement, access to a canteen, work opportunities, and
45
payment in Swiss Francs. Put simply, maximum security U.S. prisons
are incompatible with the conditions of detention required under the
Geneva Conventions.
V. PROVISIONS AUTHORIZING THE DETENTION OF ENEMY
COMBATANTS: THEN AND NOW
The Bush Administration adopted several procedural rules for
detaining enemy combatants during the war. These procedures
responded to the plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,46 which
reaffirmed the earlier World War II decision in Ex parte Quirin.47 That
case concluded that the United States may detain enemy combatants
during war time without charging them with any crimes. The Supreme
Court, in Hamdi, specified that the procedures to determine whether a
detainee is an enemy combatant need not be elaborate. Indeed, the
government can assume that the detainee is an enemy combatant unless
44.
45.
46.
47.

Remarks by the President on National Security, supra note 21.
Geneva Convention III, supra note 34, art. 21-68.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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he or she presents compelling evidence establishing otherwise. The
government can hold the detainee so long as the detainee has a fair
opportunity to challenge his or her detention and present his or her view
of matters.48
Under President Bush, the Office of Review for Detained Enemy
Combatants (OARDEC), established procedures for these hearings.49 It
held hearings called Combatant Status Review Tribunals (or CSRTS).
Although not required by the Supreme Court, or by any other legal
provision, the United States appointed each detainee a personal
representative to assist with the hearing.50 The United States also
established Annual Review Boards, also under the direction of the
Office of Review for Detained Enemy Combatants (OARDEC).51 It is
an annual review board that hears detainee requests for release. The
standard for release is that the detainee no longer poses a threat to the
United States.52
The Obama Administration recently adopted similar procedures for
detainees that it plans to hold indefinitely without trial—as opposed to
simply detaining enemy combatants during war time. Ironically, while
the stakes are higher, and the result is indefinite detention, the Obama
Administration affords fewer procedural protections for these hearings
than the Bush Administration afforded to detainees undergoing CSRTS
or ARBs.
Specifically, the new procedures provide that detainees will receive
a hearing within one year.53 At this hearing, they may have the
assistance of an appointed representative. If they would prefer a lawyer,
54
they may have one at their own expense. The detainees will receive an
unclassified version of the justification for continued detention and will
55
have an opportunity to challenge that summary. In some cases, when

48. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507.
49. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy,
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
50. Id. at (c) (stating “Each detainee shall be assigned a military officer, with the appropriate
security clearance, as a personal representative for the purpose of assisting the detainee in
connection with the review process described herein”).
51. Memorandum from Gordon England, Designated Civilian Official, Dep’t of Def.,
Implementation of Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S.
Naval
Base
Guantanamo
Bay,
Cuba
(Sept.
14,
2004),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/d20040914adminreview.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
52. Id. at Enclosure (3).
53. Executive Order, supra note 39, § 3(a).
54. Id. § 3(a)(2).
55. Id. § 3(a)(1).
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the need to protect national security is particularly high, the detainees’
representative will receive only a summary of information, as opposed to
the underlying information that justifies continued detention.56 After the
initial hearing, detainees will then receive paper reviews every three
57
years. The standard for continued detention is whether that detention
is “necessary to protect against a significant threat to the security of the
United States.”58
The procedures used by President Bush and those used by President
Obama are similar, except that detainees under President Obama will
face indefinite detention, without trial, and will only be allowed to
challenge their detention once every three years. The procedures, under
President Bush, required annual reviews (hence the name Annual
Review Boards) for all detainees simply to hold them during the war.
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the use of these basic
procedures in order to hold detainees during wartime, it is unlikely that it
would find that such procedures are sufficient to hold enemy combatants
indefinitely—not during a time of war. Additionally, it is unlikely that
the Supreme Court would permit fewer procedural protections for
indefinite detention than what it required for detention during a time of
war. What the Obama Administration proposes is novel, and unknown
to either U.S. or international law.
Precedent suggests that the Supreme Court is unlikely to uphold the
use of indefinite detention. President Obama maintains that the legal
authority for his proposed “law of war detention” is “detention
authorized by Congress under the AUMF, as informed by the laws of
59
war.” That assumes a very broad reading of the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force. However, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,60 the Supreme
Court considered whether Military Commissions under President Bush
were a proper extension of the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force. It found, contrary to earlier Supreme Court Precedent, that
Congress’s general permission to use force does not mean that Congress
had also authorized the use of Military Commissions, and thus it
invalidated the use of Military Commissions absent specific authority
from Congress.
It is unlikely that a Court would accept a broad reading of the
AUMF in this context. If a President does not have authority to hold

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. § 3(a)(5).
Id. § 3(a)(8)(b).
Id. § 2.
Id. § 9(a).
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 557 (2006).
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Military Commissions during a time of war without specific authority
from Congress, then surely the Executive lacks authority to indefinitely
detain enemy soldiers even after the end of hostilities.
VI. CONCLUSION
During the Presidential Campaign, President Obama promised to
close Guantanamo Bay and to abandon Military Commissions. Shortly
after taking office, he halted Military Commissions that were then
underway, in order to explore other alternatives.61 Nearly three years
later, Guantanamo Bay remains open, and President Obama has recently
resumed Military Commissions.
With the exception of a lone amendment to the Military
Commissions Act, the procedures governing Military Commissions
under President Obama and those under President Bush are virtually
indistinguishable. What is distinguishable is that now, under President
Obama, many detainees will receive no procedural protections under the
Military Commissions Act, but instead will face indefinite detention
under rules that afford fewer procedural protections to detain someone
for life than previously applied to temporarily hold detainees during war
time. What good are procedural protections if they are only selectively
applied, and when that decision is left only to the captor?
What the Obama Administration gives with one hand, it takes away
with the other. Ironically, the Obama Administration affords fewer
procedural protections to justify holding detainees indefinitely than
President Bush authorized in order to hold detainees during a time of
war.
President Obama proposes that, in those instances where
insufficient evidence exists to bring detainees to trial, the United States
may hold them indefinitely—even after the war ends. This declaration is
a step backwards, and could potentially put US. troops—and even
civilians—at risk for indefinite detention by dictatorial regimes. Take,
for example, Iran’s recent detention and of three U.S. college students
who accidentally wandered into Iran while hiking between Iran and
Pakistan. Ironically, Iran could have used American law to justify its
own indefinite detention of our citizens.
Iran maintained that the hikers are in fact U.S. spies. The U.S.
disagreed and repeatedly and rightfully, called for their release. (Iran
61. For additional analysis of President Obama’s decision to halt trials, see Kyndra Rotunda,
Halting Military Trials in Guantanamo Bay: Can the President Call a Time-out?, 19 MICH. ST. J.
INT’L L. 95 (2010).
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eventually released the hikers.) However, President Obama’s decision
to hold enemy combatants indefinitely in the United States, based on our
unsupported, and untried declaration that they are a danger to the United
States, opens the door for Iran and others to do exactly the same thing.
The United States holds itself out as a stalwart liberty and an
advocate for procedural protections. We consistently criticize countries
that hold prisoners in substandard conditions that lack fundamental
procedural protections. It is difficult to understand how the United
States can hold people it deems “dangerous” forever, while criticizing
countries like Iran for doing the same thing to U.S. citizens. Just as we
believe that detainees are “dangerous” to our interests, Iran maintained
that U.S. hikers were dangerous to its interests. The United States
should act cautiously when adopting provisions that allow indefinite
imprisonment without a trial.
The United States took one step forward when it improved
procedural protections contained in the Military Commissions Act, and
simultaneously took two steps back when it decided to exclude detainees
from these same procedural protections and indefinitely detain them
without any trial.

